How Congress Built the Modern Presidency
The Founders missed Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein by three decades and the distinctive aesthetic associated with Mar-a-Lago by centuries. Yet they would instantly recognize the core problem: a grotesque concentration of authority in a single executive. The modern presidency is a creature made monstrous not by accident, but by a system where “unprincipled men”—in George Washington’s warning—or more accurately, a feckless Congress, have repeatedly surrendered their constitutional role. The Framers designed a government where Congress, as the first branch named in the Constitution, would write the rules and the president would execute them. Today, that architecture has been inverted.
To understand the presidency’s power, don’t start with Article II. Start with Article I. The Constitution grants Congress the “power of the purse,” the authority to declare war, regulate commerce, and make all laws “necessary and proper” for executing its enumerated powers. This is the foundational architecture. The branch that writes the permissions ultimately controls the outcome. When Congress delegates broadly, the presidency expands. When it reclaims authority, the office contracts. The current imbalance stems directly from legislative choices over the past century.
The Delegation Disease: From WWII to the Present
The shift began in the 20th century, accelerating after 1945. Faced with complex global challenges, Congress passed statutes with open-ended phrases like “in the national interest” or “as the president shall determine.” War and subsequent “national emergencies” normalized this transfer of authority. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed after Vietnam, was an attempt to reassert congressional control over military engagement. However, as documented by the Congressional Research Service, presidents from both parties have consistently treated it as non-binding, and Congress has rarely used its power of the purse to enforce it. Similarly, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 was designed to check indefinite rule by declaration. Yet its termination mechanism requires a joint resolution, which a president can veto. Overriding that veto demands a two-thirds majority in both chambers—a hurdle so high that, in a polarized era, a president need only sustain the support of roughly one-third of one chamber plus a simple majority of the other to keep an emergency active indefinitely.
Congress’s pattern is one of performative outrage followed by passive acceptance. It leaves outdated Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) from 1991 and 2002 on the books, then expresses surprise when presidents cite them for strikes in Yemen or Syria. It appropriates billions for immigration enforcement, funds specialized tactical units, and then condemns federal deployments to cities. It routinely renews long-standing national emergency declarations that underpin tariffs and sanctions, all while complaining about executive overreach. The power of the purse—the “bluntest instrument” in the Constitution—is wielded as a blunt tool for shutdown theater, not for precise reclamation of authority.
Partisanship Over Prerogative
Why does Congress abdicate? The answer lies in the transformation of political incentives. In a polarized system with safe districts, many members fear a primary challenge from ideological purists more than a general election. This creates a powerful incentive to defend the president of their own party, not the prerogatives of the legislative branch as an institution. As political scientists describe, “congressional drift” occurs when lawmakers prefer broad delegations that spare them from casting tough, specific votes. They retain nominal authority while outsourcing accountability. If the president’s action succeeds, they claim credit; if it fails, they assign blame. Voters have, to date, rarely punished this arrangement, rewarding partisan loyalty over institutional stewardship.
This partisan alignment has replaced the “ambition counteracting ambition” that James Madison envisioned in Federalist No. 51. The friction between branches that was meant to safeguard liberty has been smoothed away by party unity. The
